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Abstract 
Recent research on learning in work situations has focussed on concepts such 
as ‘productive learning’ and ‘pedagogy of vocational learning’. In 
investigating what makes learning productive and what pedagogies enhance 
this, there is a tendency to take the notion of learning as unproblematic. This 
paper argues that much writing on workplace learning is strongly shaped by 
peoples’ understandings of learning in formal educational situations. Such 
assumptions distort attempts to understand learning at work. The main focus 
of this paper is to problematise the concept of ‘learning’ and to identify the 
implications of this for attempts to understand learning at work and the 
conditions that enhance it. An alternative conception of learning that promises 




For several years now, the adult and vocational learning research group at 
University of Technology, Sydney, (now known as OVAL  Research1), has 
been pursuing a systematic research agenda centred on issues about learning 
at work (e.g. Boud & Garrick 1999, Symes & McIntyre 2000, Beckett  & Hager 
2002). The OVAL  research group’s two most recent seminar series have been 
focussed on ‘productive learning’ and ‘pedagogy of vocational learning’. Both 
of these topics reflect a concern with conditions that enhance rich learning in 
work situations. In attempting, however, to characterise what makes learning 
productive and what pedagogies enhance this, there may be a tendency to 
take the notion of learning as unproblematic. I have elsewhere argued that 
common understandings of learning uncritically incorporate assumptions that 
derive from previous formal learning experiences (Hager forthcoming). 
Likewise Elkjaer (2003) has recently pointed out how much writing on 
workplace learning is strongly shaped by the authors’ understandings of 
learning in formal educational situations. The main focus of this paper is to 
problematise the concept of ‘learning’ and to identify the implications of this 
for attempts to understand learning at work and the conditions that enhance 
it. A key claim is that government policies that impact significantly on 
learning at work commonly treat learning as a product, i.e. as the acquisition 
of discrete items of knowledge or skill. The argument is that these policies 
thereby obstruct attempts to develop satisfactory understandings of learning 
at work. 
 
                                                 
1 The Australian Centre for Organisational, Vocational and Adult Learning Research. (For details 
see www.oval.uts.edu.au) 
Problematising the Concept of Learning 
Although learning is still widely treated as an unproblematic concept in 
educational writings, there is growing evidence that its meaning increasingly 
is being contested. For instance Brown & Palincsar (1989, p. 394) observed: 
“Learning is a term with more meanings that there are theorists”. Schoenfeld 
(1999, p. 6) noted “….that the very definition of learning is contested, and that 
assumptions that people make regarding its nature and where it takes place 
also vary widely.” According to Winch “…..the possibility of giving a scientific 
or even a systematic account of human learning is ….. mistaken” (1998, p. 2). 
His argument is that there are many and diverse cases of learning, each 
subject to “constraints in a variety of contexts and cultures” which precludes 
them from being treated in a general way (1998, p. 85). He concludes that “… 
grand theories of learning …. are underpinned … invariably … by faulty 
epistemological premises” (Winch, 1998, p. 183). 
 
Not only is the concept of learning disputed amongst theorists, it seems that 
even those with the greatest claims to practical knowledge of learning may be 
deficient in their understanding. Those bastions of learning, higher education 
institutions can trace their origins back into the mists of time. If anyone 
knows from experience what learning is it should be them. Yet the recent 
cyber learning debacle suggests otherwise. Many of the world’s most 
illustrious universities have invested many millions of dollars setting up 
suites of online courses in the expectation of making large profits from off-
campus students. According to Brabazon (2002), these initiatives have 
manifestly failed since prospective students were not prepared to pay the 
fees. Many of these online courses are now available free as a backup resource 
for on-campus students. Brabazon’s analysis is that these university ‘experts’ 
on learning have confused technology with teaching and tools with learning. 
The staggering sums of money mis-invested in online education certainly 
shows that universities may not be the experts in learning that they think they 
are. 
 
We can take Brabazon’s analysis a step further. The reason why tools were 
confused with learning, I argue, is that learning is not a well understood 
concept at the start of the 21st century. Perhaps it is in a similar position to the 
concept of motion at the end of the middle ages. Of course, motion is one of 
the central concepts in physics, just as learning is a central concept in 
education, and the social sciences generally. For a long time, understanding of 
motion was limited by adherence to the Aristotelian attempt to provide a 
single account of all motion. Aristotle proposed a second-order distinction 
between natural and violent motions. It was the ‘nature’ of all terrestrial 
bodies to have a natural motion towards the centre of the universe (the centre 
of the earth); but bodies were also subject to violent motions in any direction 
imparted by disruptive, external, ‘non-natural’ causes. So the idea was to 
privilege one kind of motion as basic and to account for others in terms of 
non-natural disruptions to this natural motion. The Aristotelian account 
persisted for so long because it was in accord with ‘common sense’ ideas on 
motion. Everyone was familiar with motion and thought that they 
understood it. Likewise, everyone has experienced formal schooling and this 
shapes how they understand learning. Thus, the type of learning that is 
familiar to everyone gains privileged status. The worth of other kinds of 
learning is judged by how well they approximate the favoured kind (Beckett 
& Hager 2002, section 6.1). The dominance of this concept of learning is also 
evident in educational thought, where there has been a major focus on 
learning in formal education settings. This dominant view of learning also fits 
well with ‘folk’ conceptions of the mind (Bereiter 2002).  
 
Real progress in understanding motion came when physicists departed from 
‘common sense’ ideas and recognised that there are many different types of 
motion – falling, projectile, pendulum, wave, etc. - each requiring their own 
account. Likewise, it seems there are many types of learning and things that 
can be learnt – propositions, skills, behaviours, attitudes, etc. Efforts to 
understand these may well require a range of theories each with somewhat 
different assumptions. 
 
The Monolithic Influence of Viewing Learning as a Product 
There is currently a dominant view of learning that is akin to the Aristotelian 
view of motion in its pervasive influence. It provides an account of 
supposedly the best kind of learning, and all cases of learning are judged by 
how well they fit this view. This dominant view of learning – the ‘common 
sense’ account – views the mind as a ‘container’ and ‘knowledge as a type of 
substance’ (Lakoff & Johnson 1980). 
Under the influence of the mind-as-container metaphor, knowledge is 
treated as consisting of objects contained in individual minds, 
something like the contents of mental filing cabinets.  
(Bereiter 2002, p. 179) 
 
Thus there is a focus on ‘adding more substance’ to the mind. This is the ‘folk 
theory’ of learning (e.g. Bereiter 2002). It emphasises the products of learning.  
 
At this stage it might be objected that the educationally sophisticated have 
long ago moved beyond viewing learning as a product. Certainly, as shown 
later in this paper, the educational arguments for an alternative view have 
been persuasive for quite some time now. Nevertheless, much educational 
policy and practice, including policies and practices that directly impact on 
the emerging interest in learning at work, are clearly rooted in the learning as 
product view. For instance, typical policy documents relating to Competency-
Based Training view work performance as a series of decontextualised atomic 
elements, which novice workers are thought of as needing to pick up one by 
one. Once a discrete element is acquired, transfer or application to 
appropriate future circumstances by the learner is assumed to be 
unproblematic. This is a pure learning as product approach. Similarly, policy 
documents on generic skills (core or basic skills) typically reflect similar 
assumptions. Putative generic skills, such as communication and problem 
solving, are presented as discrete, decontextualised elements that, once 
acquired, can simply be transferred to diverse situations. Certainly, in 
literature emanating from employer groups, this assumption is endemic. 
These, then, are two policy areas that are closely linked to learning at work 
that are dominated by learning as product assumptions. 
 
Of course, Lyotard (1984) and other postmodern writers (e.g. Usher & 
Edwards 1994) have argued that the recent neo-liberal marketisation of 
education results in a commodification of knowledge, in which knowledge is 
equated with information. Such information can, for instance, be readily 
stored and transmitted via microelectronic technology. Students become 
consumers of educational commodities. All of this is grist to the learning as 
product mill. However, it needs to be emphasised that learning as product 
was the dominant mindset long before the rise of neo-liberal marketisation of 
education. This is reflected in standard international educational 
nomenclature: acquisition of content, transfer of learning, delivery of courses, 
course providers, course offerings, course load, student load, etc. So despite 
advances in educational thought, the learning as product view has remained 
very resilient. It is as though formal education systems have never gotten 
beyond a mass production mindset reminiscent of the industrial era. 
 
The dominant learning as product view involves two basic assumptions. The 
stability assumption, which requires the products of learning to be relatively 
stable over time. This stability enables learning to be incorporated into 
curricula and textbooks, to be passed on from teachers to students, its 
attainment to be measured in examinations, and the examination results for 
different teachers and different institutions to be readily amenable to 
comparison. Thus formal education systems depend for assessment purposes 
on learning that is stable, familiar and widely understood. Engestrom puts 
this assumption of what he calls ‘standard theories of learning’ as follows: ‘a 
self-evident presupposition that the knowledge or skill to be acquired is itself 
stable and reasonably well-defined’ (Engestrom 2001, p. 137). As well, there is 
a replicability assumption – that the learning of different learners can be 
literally the same or identical. The sorting and grading functions of education 
systems requires the possibility of this kind of foundational certainty of marks 
and grades. These matters are reflected in the common term used to denote 
replicability of learning - different students are said to have the same 
‘attainment’ (something like two filing cabinets having identical contents). 
 
The pervasive influence of the ‘learning as product’ view can perhaps be 
thought of in terms of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus. For Bourdieu (1990b), 
habitus is a kind of socialised subjectivity, that is socially acquired, embodied 
systems of dispositions. As such, they represent a fine balance between 
structure and agency: 
Agents to some extent fall into the practice that is theirs rather than 
freely choosing it or being impelled into it by mechanical constraints. 
      (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 90) 
The suggestion is that ‘learning as product’, as socially acquired habitus, is 
not immutably entrenched. However, change is possible only to the extent 
that the wider social forces that transmit it are themselves altered. 
 
Difficulties Flowing from Viewing Learning as a Product 
If there are indeed many kinds of learning, as suggested earlier, then it will 
not be surprising that the monotheoretical account faces a growing number of 
difficulties. Four particular difficulties for the ‘learning as a product’ view are 
discussed below.  
 
1. Failures of theory/practice accounts of performance  
Theory/practice accounts of work performance are based on what Schön 
(1983) calls "technical rationality". This is the view that practitioners use their 
disciplinary knowledge to analyse and solve the work problems that their 
daily practice throws up. According to Altrichter, Posch & Somekh (1993), the 
three main assumptions of technical rationality, or the theory/practice 
account, are: 
• There are general solutions to practical problems. 
• These solutions can be developed outside practical situations (in 
research or administrative centres). 
• The solutions can be translated into practitioners' actions by means of 
publications, training, administrative orders, etc. 
 
But the world of actual practice is much messier than this tidy schema 
suggests. For one thing, ready-made problems do not simply present 
themselves to the practitioner. The implications for the theory/practice 
approach are, seemingly, fatal. As Beckett & Hager (2002, p. 132) put it: 
 
….. the difficulty for technical rationality is not just that problems are 
not presented ready-made, and that, therefore, practitioners need to 
become proficient in problem-setting. Once a problem has been 
specified, it may not fit standard applied science categories. So both the 
data required and the solution method may be unclear. As well, the 
problem situation may be unique or unstable. This may require that 
the problem be continually redefined. 
 
Bourdieu (1990a) indirectly attacks the theory/practice account, by making a 
distinction between two logics: the logic of practice and the logic of the 
theorisation of practice. He sees a strong tension between the two, between 
the logic of practice which is situated, contextual, embodied and tacit, and the 
logic of the theorisation of practice which centres on generality, abstraction 
and logical reasoning. Bourdieu’s critique is that “the logic of practice can 
only be grasped through constructs which destroy it as such.” (1990a, p. 11). 
While accepting that there is a tension here, my response is that the gap may 
not be so unbridgeable. Rather, the logic of the theorisation of practice has 
focussed on the wrong concepts, ones that bring with them unacceptable 
assumptions such as ‘practice is application of theory’. Hence theoretical 
accounts of practice have failed because they drew on the wrong concepts. 
Better concepts that involve more relevant assumptions might yet produce a 
conceptual understanding of practice. 
 
2.  Failures of the front-end model of vocational preparation 
The ‘learning as product’ view underpins the front-end model of vocational 
preparation, a model being questioned increasingly for its failures. The term 
‘front- end’ refers to models of vocational preparation that require a period of 
formal education and/or training that needs to be completed by entrants to 
an occupation before they can be regarded as qualified workers. This period 
of formal education and/or training usually takes place in classrooms remote 
from the workplace (Beckett and Hager 2002, p. 99). But, most importantly, 
this model is called ‘front- end’ “…. because it implies that all of the learning 
that is needed for a lifetime of practice has been completed” (Beckett and 
Hager 2002, p. 99). The perceived failures of the front-end model of vocational 
preparation are of various kinds. These include: 
- the increasing realisation that front-end courses in themselves are 
insufficient to prepare novices for a lifetime of practice. (For one thing, 
practice invariably involves components of tacit knowledge or ‘know-
how’ that cannot be acquired in formal settings remote from practice. So 
some suitable experience of real practice is necessary to attain proficiency 
as a practitioner.) 
- the growing rejection of the technical-rationality assumption (see above) 
that underpins many front-end vocational preparation courses. 
- growing  doubts about the capacity of the front-end model to prepare 
practitioners for accelerating change.  
(For more discussion of these see Beckett & Hager, 2002, pp. 101-5). 
 
A further reason to question the efficacy of the front-end model of vocational 
preparation stems from a range of research on learning in higher education. 
Although this research is mainly focussed on learning in undergraduate 
courses, there is no reason to doubt that the findings would apply generally 
to front-end vocational preparation courses of all kinds. This 
phenomenographic research on learning in higher education has led 
practitioners to centre on concepts such as surface vs. deep approaches to 
learning. This research has found that much learning in higher education 
settings is far from optimal (e.g. see Bowden & Marton 1998, Prosser & 
Trigwell 1999). A typical finding is that “…. despite students’ having 
successfully negotiated the assessment system, little understanding of 
fundamental concepts has been gained” (Bowden & Marton 1998, p. 61). This 
clearly signals a failure of the assumptions of the front-end model of 
vocational preparation. The supposed discrete bit-by-bit acquisition of 
learning products is simply not happening. This is alarming for those who 
adhere to a learning as product view. However, if learning is viewed as a 
process, as assumed by the emerging view of learning outlined later in this 
paper, these findings may be less unexpected. If learning a traditional 
discipline is a gradual process of growing understanding, rather than discrete 
bit-by-bit mastery, then perhaps key conceptual development will remain 
incomplete even after several years of intense study. This would suggest that 
rather than viewing learning as atom-by-atom acquisition of content, a better 
image to represent the gaining of high level proficiency in a discipline might 
be something like the ‘gradual clearing of a fog in a landscape’. Thus, rather 
than concept acquisition being thought of as an all-or-nothing learning event, 
it might be better understood as something that grows over time for the 
learner. During this process of concept acquisition within a discipline or field, 
the import of a range of central concepts gradually deepens for the learner, as 
does an appreciation of the links between the various concepts. 
 
3. Denigration of learning 
The wide acceptance of the ‘learning as a product’ view extends to the 
workplace. Educators, of course, use terms like ‘learner’ and ‘learning’ in 
either approving or relatively neutral ways. It is regarded as unproblematic 
that learning is usually a good thing. Similar approbation is implied when 
workplace educators deploy such terms as workplace learning, lifelong 
learning, and organisational learning. But as research reported by Boud & 
Solomon (2003) suggests, in workplaces not too far removed from the 
academy, unconscious commitment to the learning as product view leads 
people to assign negative connotations to terms such as ‘learner’ and 
‘learning’. These terms are viewed negatively because they seem to conflict 
with workers’ overall perception of their identity and status within the 
organisation. It is precisely because of the dominant learning as product view 
that in the community at large, being a learner can be seriously problematic. 
On the product view of learning a learner is someone who has yet to acquire 
all of the requisite products or mental items for carrying out the work. Thus 
to be a learner in the workplace on this view is: 
• to have a deficit, e.g. to be inexperienced or incompetent. 
• to therefore have less power, position, recognition, or legitimation. 
• to need to leave behind the role of ‘learner’ as quickly as possible (the ‘L 
plate’ syndrome). 
 
Hence, there are also perceived tensions in people being given dual labels by 
workplace educators or theorists, e.g. being both a ‘worker’ and a ‘learner’ or 
a ‘professional’ and a ‘learner’, at the same time. The moral of all this is that 
the terms ‘learner’ and ‘learning’ do different work in different contexts. The 
act of naming someone (especially oneself) as a learner can be controversial. 
Though Boud & Solomon found that the act of naming something as learning 
is usually somewhat less controversial. Overall, though, as this research 
demonstrates, the ongoing influence of the dominant learning as product 
view is still evident in workplaces.  
 
4  Lifelong learning is viewed as odd and unattractive 
The learning as product view clearly has unattractive implications for 
thinking about lifelong learning. For a start it suggests endless accumulation 
of discrete pieces of learning. One imagines over-crammed filing cabinets. If 
learning is centrally about minds acquiring propositions, lifelong learning is 
potentially about perpetual enrolment in formal accredited courses. The 
individual learner is in danger of being condemned to learn all 
subjects/disciplines. In this respect, part of the ‘folk theory’ of learning is an 
acceptance of a ‘quiz show’ view of what it is for someone to be learned. (This 
contrasts with the Socratic view that the more you ‘know’, the more you 
know that you don’t know). As well, the focus here is firmly on the individual 
learner. Illich (1973) was right that we have been schooled to accept a 
‘consumer of formal courses’ view of knowledge acquisition. In addition, if 
the concept of ‘learning’ sometimes carries in the workplace the negative 
connotations identified by Boud & Solomon above, these will equally tarnish 
the notion of ‘lifelong learning’. In that case, the idea of lifelong learning at 
work will be distinctly unpalatable. This is not to deny that lifelong learning 
discourse has had some success in changing peoples’ understandings of 
‘learning’. However, the ongoing influence of the dominant learning as 
product view will certainly reduce the efficacy of that discourse. 
 
Theoretical Responses to These Difficulties 
A number of recent theoretical developments reflect growing disenchantment 
with the ‘learning as a product’ view. These include: 
 
1. New directions in psychology  
There is a clear move away from the idea that learning is paradigmatically a 
mind being stored with contents (e.g. Bruner 1996, Bereiter 2002). As Bereiter 
puts it: 
… everyday cognition makes more sense if we abandon the idea of a 
mind operating on stored mental content and replace it with the idea 
of a mind continually and automatically responding to the world and 
making sense of whatever befalls it. I call this the ‘connectionist view 
of mind’…    (Bereiter 2002, pp. 196-7). 
 
Connectionism provides an alternative metaphor, which enables us to 
conceive of a mind that can act knowledgeably without containing 
propositions or other knowledge objects. To gain benefit from the 
connectionist metaphor, we must find ways to construct mentalistic 
accounts that do not refer to things residing, being searched for, or 
undergoing changes in the mind.   (Bereiter 2002, pp. 179). 
 
2. Learning transfer research 
Learning transfer research has led to recent proposals to reconceptualise 
transfer and, by implication, learning. Researchers see the institution of 
formal education being underpinned by the basic assumption that transfer is 
a ubiquitous phenomenon. However despite increasing power of 
experimental techniques, transfer “seems to vanish when experimenters try to 
pin it down” (Schoenfeld 1999, p. 7). As Bransford & Schwartz (1999) point 
out, transfer is indeed rare if it is restricted to ‘replicative’ transfer, which 
involves both the stability and replicability assumptions that were noted 
above. However, they propose that we broaden the notion of ‘transfer’ by 
including an emphasis on ‘preparation for future learning’, the ability to learn 
in new environments. This proposal is very consistent with the idea of 
learning as a process and the emerging view of learning, which are discussed 
in the next section. So the point of transfer is not replication. They suggest this 
broader notion is ‘knowing with’ rather than ‘knowing that’ (replicative) or 
‘knowing how’ (applicative). 
 
The Emerging View of Learning 
As various points discussed so far suggest, there is a problem with regarding 
learning as the acquisition of discrete items that can then be called up at will. 
With regard to each distinct item, the implication is that, once acquired, the 
learning with respect to that item is complete. Rather, as much of the above 
discussion suggests, learning might be viewed more fruitfully as an ongoing 
process. Dewey (1916) was an early seminal figure in educational thought 
who saw learning as a process. For Dewey, the overriding principle is that the 
good life for humans is one in which they live in harmony with their 
environment. But because the environment is in a state of continuous flux, so 
humans need to grow and readjust constantly to it so as to remain in 
harmony with it. Thus, for Dewey, education must instil the lifelong capacity 
to grow and to readjust constantly to the environment. Since, argued Dewey, 
reflective thinking as well as inquiry, democracy, problem solving, active 
learning, experiential learning, etc. are methods that are necessary for humans 
to learn to readjust effectively to the environment, these are the 
teaching/learning methods that must feature in education. Dewey argues that 
reflection is central to effective inquiry and problem solving, but this should 
not be seen merely in narrowly rational terms. For Dewey, reflective thinking 
is more holistic, incorporating social, moral and political aspects of the 
contexts in which it occurs.  
 
Dewey can be regarded as a pioneer of the conception of learning as a process 
(or, more accurately, as a dialectical interplay of process and product). The 
sharp distinction between process and product of learning is plausible 
whenever learning is separated from action. However, when learning is 
closely linked with action, the two are not sharply distinguished at all. The 
process facilitates the product which at the same time enhances further 
processes and so on. (While bearing in mind the dialectical interplay of 
process and product, in the following I will refer to ‘learning as process’ for 
the sake of simplicity). Even in his lifetime Dewey’s ideas were widely noted 
and discussed. However they can hardly be said to have transformed 
educational thought, let alone practice, as the ongoing persistence of the 
dominant metaphor of learning as a product shows. However, various recent 
developments in educational thought have brought the notion of learning as a 
process into new prominence. Bereiter’s connectionist view of the mind as an 
entity that continually and automatically responds to the world, making sense 
of whatever befalls it, is an example. Likewise, the Bransford & Schwartz 
concept of ‘preparation for future learning’ centres on learning as a process 
rather than as a product. More generally, the two most influential 
contemporary approaches to understanding learning centre on viewing it as a 
process. Firstly, there are the sociocultural theorists, such as Lave and Wenger 
(1991) and Wertsch (1998). This approach focuses on processes rather than 
entities or structures, and stresses the inseparability of the individual and the 
social. Secondly, there is activity theory, a type of theorising originally 
inspired by the work of Vygotsky and Leont’ov, and developed by Engestrom 
and others (e.g. Engestrom , Miettinen & Punamaki 1999, Engestrom 2001). 
This approach produces dynamic accounts of human activity, including 
learning, that emphasise its mediation by tools (understood in the broadest 
sense). Taken together, these trends in educational thought support the claim 
that learning as a process is the emerging view of learning. 
 
When learning is viewed primarily as a process rather than as a product 
different features are emphasised. Learning becomes a process that changes 
both the learner and the environment (with the learner being part of the 
environment rather than a detached spectator) (Beckett & Hager 2002 section 
7.9). This view of learning underlines its contextuality, as well as the influence 
of cultural and social factors. It is holistic in that it points to the organic, 
whole person nature of learning, including the importance of dispositions and 
abilities. Viewing learning as a process also has some positive consequences 
that counter the unfortunate implications of viewing it as a product (outlined 
earlier). If learning is seen as an ongoing process, then: 
 
• Learning is a normal and desirable thing, since its ends are never really 
reached. 
• Lifelong learning is usual, and even inevitable for humans. At its best 
informal learning is a key part of lifelong learning. The social and 
contextual aspects of learning gain their rightful emphasis. 
 
Another important aspect of the emerging view of learning is that it accounts 
better for the phenomenon of tacit knowledge. The learning as product view, 
with its focus on knowledge as relatively stable, well-defined propositions, 
regards the tacit (literally that which cannot be put into words) with 
suspicion. For the learning as product view, the best kind of learning is 
transparent. So, at best, tacit knowledge is a dubious kind of learning. 
However, once our understanding of learning centres on the human capacity 
to grow and to readjust constantly to the environment, much important 
learning is seen to be inescapably tacit. The human capacity to grow and 
thrive in an environment is underpinned by a diversity of attributes, such as 
capabilities, abilities, and skills, that cannot be precisely specified. Our 
inability to provide a precise characterisation of many of our important 
capabilities, abilities, and skills was famously noted by Polanyi: 
I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we 
can know more than we can tell. This fact seems obvious enough; but it is 
not easy to say exactly what it means. Take an example. We know a 
person’s face, and can recognise it among a thousand, indeed among a 
million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognise a face we know. 
So most of this knowledge cannot be put into words.   (1983, p. 4) 
 
And, of course, this argument applies to not just our knowledge of human 
capabilities, abilities, and skills. Much of human experience is meaningful in 
ways that elude precise linguistic formulation. As Magee put it: 
…. the most important to us of our dispositions cannot be put into 
words … - being in love, for example, or our feeling for our friends, or 
what music means to us in our lives, or our relationship with our 
children, or our passion for philosophy (come to that a passion for 
anything, even golf).   (Magee 1998, p. 99) 
 
Passmore (1980) has drawn attention to the educational importance of the 
often overlooked capacities and dispositions that are presupposed by other 
types of learning. His examples include: learning to- walk, run, speak, read, 
write, and add. According to Passmore (1980, p. 37) such capacities are a 
major, perhaps the major, class of human learning. For Passmore in normal 
cases “.... every human being acquires a number of capacities for action ..... 
whether as a result of experience, of imitation or of deliberate teaching....”.  
Likewise, Winch (1998, p. 19) argues that knowledge is largely dispositional. 
Overall, the transparency of learning assumption, favoured by the learning as 
product view, is challenged by the increasing recognition of the importance of 
non-transparent types of learning, one of which, dispositional learning, is 
presupposed by other forms of learning. 
 
The following definitions highlight the contrasts between the product  and 
process views of learning. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, learning 
means: ‘To acquire knowledge of (a subject) or skill (an art, etc.) As a result of 
study, experience or teaching.’ Besides portraying learning as a product, this 
definition is in danger of limiting learning to propositions and skills. The 
more holistic emerging view of learning is captured in Schoenfeld’s (1999. p. 
6) definition: ‘… coming to understand things and developing increased 
capacities to do what one wants or needs to do …’. Here learning is clearly 
portrayed as an ongoing process. We can further investigate the notion of 
learning as a process, by considering some influential metaphors that have 
been closely associated in the literature with the concept of learning. 
 
Learning Metaphors 
Sfard (1998) argued that two basic metaphors – learning as acquisition and as 
participation – have underpinned much educational thought. As the 
prominence of the learning as product view discussed earlier suggests, the 
acquisition metaphor has long been influential. It subordinates the process of 
learning to its products – the something acquired (knowledge, skills, 
attitudes, values, behaviour, understanding, etc). Sfard contrasts this 
metaphor with the increasingly influential participation one, claiming that 
neither metaphor by itself is adequate to understanding of the full 
complexities of learning. Certainly, the acquisition metaphor emphasises 
learning as a product and the ‘folk theory’ of a mind steadily accumulating 
stable, discrete substances or atoms. In contrast, it appears that the 
participation metaphor presents learning as either a product or a process. This 
is so because, while participation itself is a process, it appears that the learner 
comes to belong more and more to the community of practice by acquiring 
the right characteristics (products of learning).  
 
An obvious question is whether Sfard’s two metaphors exhaust the 
possibilities, or are there other significant learning metaphors that view 
learning as a process? Sfard does not mention other possible metaphors, but 
Elkjaer (2003), drawing on Dewey, suggests that inquiry is a more suitable 
metaphor for thinking about organisational learning. In support of the idea 
that inquiry is a more potent metaphor than acquisition, Elkjaer 
illuminatingly quotes Dewey: 
…… thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking into things, of 
investigating. Acquiring is always secondary, and instrumental to the 
act of inquiring. It is seeking, a quest, for something that is not at hand. 
       (Dewey 1916, p. 148) 
 
While being sympathetic to Elkjaer’s Deweyan perspective, I maintain that an 
even better metaphor for capturing learning as a process is construction (or re-
construction). This is also a Deweyan idea, but is, I argue, superior to the 
inquiry metaphor for suggesting the rich scope of the changes that are 
implicated in Deweyan learning. The construction metaphor encapsulates the 
construction/re-construction of the learning, of the learner’s self, and of the 
environment (world), which includes the self. 
 
Thus, the argument is that the construction metaphor captures the various 
dimensions of change much better than participation or inquiry metaphors 
do. Even some well-known sociocultural theorists, whose work has brought 
the participation metaphor to prominence, seemingly recognise its 
limitations. For instance, Rogoff (1995) proposes viewing learning and 
development within a community in terms of three “…. inseparable, mutually 
constituting planes comprising activities that can become the focus of analysis 
at different times, but with the others necessarily remaining in the 
background of the analysis.” (p. 139) The three planes of analysis are: 
 Apprenticeship (community/institutional) 
 Guided participation (interpersonal) 
 Participatory appropriation (personal) 
It is the third of these that particularly involves construction processes, since 
appropriation of a personal kind clearly implies something stronger than 
mere replication. So Rogoff proposes that participation needs 
supplementation. 
 
The three metaphors about learning link differently to lifelong learning and 
related concepts. As noted already, the acquisition metaphor has unattractive 
implications for lifelong learning, suggesting endless accumulation of discrete 
pieces of learning. As well, the focus here is firmly on the individual learner. 
By contrast, the participation metaphor is undoubtedly more congenial for 
lifelong learning. People participate in many activities at many levels, 
signalling much scope for learning. This learning is at whole person level 
rather than just being centred on the mind. As well, rather than focussing 
solely on individual learners, the participation metaphor accepts the 
importance of learning by groups, communities and organisations. Such 
learning that goes beyond individual learners appears to be an important 
dimension of much learning in workplaces. However, participation in itself 
does not ensure learning. Quite the opposite, as is demonstrated by 
participation in closed societies or organisations that are dedicated to 
resisting change (e.g. certain religious societies). The construction metaphor, 
however, with its tripartite focus on the construction of learning, of learners, 
and of the environments in which they operate, has a wider scope. One in 
which change, learning and human flourishing are inextricably enmeshed. So 
it seems that Sfard’s two basic metaphors need expansion to include 
(re)construction as a third metaphor, that will enable learning at work and 
lifelong learning to receive proper attention. 
 
What Does the Preceding Mean for Workplace Learning? 
The main conclusion is, I trust, clear. Workplace learning is poorly 
understood if it is viewed as a product. Instead, there are considerable 
advantages in viewing it primarily as a process, one that incorporates 
important social, cultural, and political dimensions. Both work practices and 
the learning that accompanies them are processes. We might almost view 
practice as a process that coincides with learning. This process feature is also 
best captured by a (re)construction metaphor, given that the use of metaphor 
seems to be unavoidable when thinking about learning. It also seems that we 
should be wary of attempts to account for workplace learning in terms of 
single overriding factors or via universally applicable theories (see Hager 
1999). So I conclude that four major criteria for assessing workplace learning 
theories are how well they:  
 
• view such learning as a process 
• take account of the social, cultural, and political dimensions 
• reflect a (re)construction metaphor 
• avoid single factor or universally applicable explanations 
 
My current work involves an examination of various theories of workplace 
learning in terms of how well they exemplify these criteria (Hager 
forthcoming). In a previous OVAL seminar (Hager 2001) I proposed four 
dimensions for understanding productive learning: 
 
1.  productive learning re-defines existing patterns and rules.  
2.  productive learning involves the creation of new learning that 
simultaneously reshapes the environment in which the learning occurs. 
This reshaped environment includes the learner via 'autopoiesis', the 
organisation and the work practices. So the process and product of 
learning are inextricably linked. 
3.  productive learning involves the social, cultural and political 
construction of individual identities. 
4.  productive learning centres on holistic, whole person, embodied 
judgements. 
 
The first two of these clearly exemplify the first three of the four major criteria 
for assessing workplace learning theories identified above. The third of these 
is itself one of the four major criteria. The holism of the first fourth of these 
resonates with the second and fourth of the four major criteria.  
 
It will only be, I argue, in further explicating these kinds of relationships that 
we will gain better theoretical and practical understanding of workplace 
learning. In the process, we may even learn to think more creatively and 




Altrichter H., Posch P. & Somekh B. (1993) Teachers Investigate Their Work. 
London & New York: Routledge. 
 
Beckett D. & Hager P. (2002) Life, Work and Learning: Practice in Postmodernity. 
Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy of Education 14. London 
and New York: Routledge. 
 
Bereiter C. (2002) Education and Mind in the Knowledge Age. Mahwah, 
N.J./London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Boud D. & Garrick J. (eds.) Understanding Learning at Work. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Boud & Solomon (2004) ‘”I Don’t Think I Am a Learner”: Acts of Naming 
Learners at Work’, Journal of Workplace Learning, Vol. 16, Nos. 1-2, (March 
issue in press). 
 
Bourdieu P. (1990a) The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Bourdieu, P. (1990b) In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Practice, Polity Press: 
Cambridge. 
 
Bowden J. & Marton F. (1998) The University of Learning. London: Kogan Page. 
 
Brabazon T. (2002) Digital Hemlock: Internet Education and the Poisoning of 
Teaching. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 
 
Bransford J.D. & Schwartz D.L. (1999) ‘Rethinking Transfer: A Simple 
Proposal With Multiple Implications’, Review of Research in Education, Vol 24, 
pp. 61-100. 
 
Brown A.L. & Palincsar A.S. (1989) ‘Guided, cooperative learning and 
individual knowledge acquisition’ in L.B. Resnick (ed.) Knowing, Learning and 
Instruction: Essays in Honour of Robert Glaser. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 
pp. 393-451. 
 
Bruner J. (1996) The Culture of Education. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard, 
University Press. 
 
Dewey J. (1916) Democracy and Education. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Elkjaer B. (2003) ‘Organizational Learning with a Pragmatic Slant’, 
International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 22, No. 5, pp. 481-94. 
 
Engestrom Y., Miettinen R. & Punamaki R.-L. (1999) Perspectives on Activity 
Theory. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Engestrom Y. (2001) ‘Expansive Learning at Work: Toward an Activity 
Theoretical Reconceptualization’, Journal of Education and Work, Vol. 14, No. 1, 
pp. 133-56. 
 
Hager P. (1999) ‘Finding a Good Theory of Workplace Learning’, in D. Boud 
& J. Garrick (eds.) Understanding Learning at Work. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 65-82. 
 
Hager P. (2001) ‘Towards a Productive Conception of Productive Learning’, 
Research in Adult and Vocational Learning Productive Learning Seminar 
Series, University of Technology, Sydney, 11 September 2001. (Available at 
www.oval.uts.edu.au) 
 
Hager P. (forthcoming) ‘Current Theories of Workplace Learning: A Critical 
Assessment’ in International Handbook of Educational Policy. 
Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Illich, I. (1973), Deschooling Society, Penguin, Harmondsworth. 
 
Lakoff G. & Johnson M. (1980) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Lave J. & Wenger E. (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lyotard J.F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Magee B. (1998) Confessions of a Philosopher. London: Phoenix. 
 
Passmore J. (1980) The Philosophy of Teaching. London: Duckworth. 
 
Polanyi M. (1983) The Tacit Dimension. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith. 
 
Prosser M. & Trigwell K. (1999) Understanding Learning and Teaching: The 
Experience of Higher Education. Buckingham: Open University Press/Society 
for Research into Higher Education. 
 
Rogoff B. (1995) ‘Observing Sociocultural Activity on Three Planes: 
Participatory Appropriation, Guided Participation, and Apprenticeship’ in J.J. 
Wertsch, P. del Rio & A. Alvarez Sociocultural Studies of Mind Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schoenfeld A.H. (1999) ‘Looking Toward the 21st Century: Challenges of 
Educational Theory and Practice’, Educational Researcher, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 4-
14. 
 
Schön D.A. (1983) The Reflective Practitioner. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Sfard A. (1998) ‘On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of 
Choosing Just One’, Educational Researcher, 27(2), 4-13. 
 
Symes C. & McIntyre J. (eds.) Working Knowledge: The New Vocationalism and 
Higher Education. Buckingham: Open University Press/Society for Research 
into Higher Education. 
 
Usher R. & Edwards R. (1994) Postmodernism and Education. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Wertsch J.V. (1998) Mind as Action. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Winch C. (1998) The Philosophy of Human Learning. Routledge International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Education. London and New York: Routledge. 
